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State of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-11021
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF
INTERESTED PERSONS
Amicus Curiae Docs4PatientCare is a nonprofit 501(c)(6) membership
organization of doctors.

Amicus Curiae Benjamin Rush Society is an

unincorporated nonprofit membership group of medical students, doctors, and
others that was organized by, is administered by, and is part of the Pacific
Research Institute (PRI). PRI is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization dedicated to
promoting free markets.
None of the above entities is publicly traded or has any parent corporations,
and no publicly traded corporation owns 10% or more or any of the above entities.
Pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1, the undersigned counsel certifies that, in
addition to the persons and entities listed in the briefs for the parties and amici
curiae that have previously been filed with this court, the following persons and
entities may have an interest in the outcome of this case, and that, to the best of his
knowledge, the list of persons and entities in the party and amici briefs already
filed is otherwise complete:
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amicus Curiae Docs4PatientCare is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) membership
organization of concerned physicians committed to the establishment of a health
care system that preserves the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship, promotes
quality of care, supports affordable access to all Americans, and protects patients’
freedom of choice. It has an interest in this case because the individual mandate
contradicts these fundamental principles and sets a dangerous precedent regarding
the inappropriate use of federal power to dictate the choices of Americans.
Amicus Curiae Benjamin Rush Society is a membership organization that
includes medical students, residents, fellows, and doctors across the political
spectrum — as well as members of the general public — who believe that the
profession of medicine calls its practitioners to serve their patients, rather than the
government. The Society believes that the physician-patient relationship is a
voluntary and mutually beneficial one. Both parties have a right to enter this
relationship freely. The proper role of government is to protect this freedom, not to
diminish it. The Society is part of the Pacific Research Institute. The Society is
interested in this case because the individual mandate undermines such freedom by
compelling some individuals to purchase health insurance notwithstanding their
free choice to contrary.
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The Pacific Research Institute is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization that
champions freedom, opportunity, and personal responsibility by advancing freemarket policy solutions to the issues that impact the daily lives of all Americans.
And it demonstrates how free interaction among consumers, businesses, and
voluntary associations is more effective than government action at providing the
important results we all seek—good schools, quality health care, a clean
environment, and economic growth. Founded in 1979 and based in San Francisco,
PRI is a non-profit, non-partisan organization supported by private contributions.
its activities include publications, public events, media commentary, invited
legislative testimony, and community outreach.
This brief is being filed with the consent of all parties.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the district court erred in holding that the minimum coverage
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care
Act” or “ACA”) is not a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The individual mandate cannot be constitutionally justified by the federal
appellants’ claims that it regulates inactivity – the failure to obtain healthcare
coverage – that nevertheless has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. While
2
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appellants attempt to misdirect attention with gaudy (and questionable) numbers –
50 million uninsured, $116 billion in annual consumption of healthcare by those
uninsured, $43 billion of such care for which providers supposedly are not
compensated – even assuming, arguendo, such numbers to be true they have little
to do with, and are not cured by, the individual mandate. Indeed, the federal
government’s own analyses confirm that the individual mandate does not address
the bulk of the alleged problem of uncompensated care, does not significantly
reduce any costs absorbed or passed on by healthcare providers, and what little
uncompensated care costs it might reduce does not have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
Comparing the design and operation of the individual mandate with the
nature of the uncompensated care alleged by appellants, there is a nearly complete
disconnect (and sometimes a negative correlation) between the individual
mandate’s effect on healthcare coverage and the provision of uncompensated care.
The individual mandate at best only causes 16 million persons to obtain coverage
they otherwise would forego. A comparison of compensation rates for healthcare
consumption by those 16 million persons with and without such coverage shows
that the mandate will actually increase uncompensated care by pushing millions of
uninsured into Medicaid (which generates a far higher rate of uncompensated care
than do the uninsured on their own). And even apart from the effects of increased
3
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Medicaid enrollment, the mandate only even has the potential of act upon $1.2
billion in genuinely uncompensated care from those 16 million people.
In the context of the $2.42 trillion in total annual spending for healthcare, the
trivial amount of uncompensated care affected by the individual mandate (even
using the government’s own numbers) amounts to a mere 0.05% of total spending
on healthcare and does not substantially affect the prices for healthcare or
insurance. Even assuming the alleged problem of uncompensated care in general,
therefore, the individual mandate thus does not address that problem, may in fact
worsen it, and thus cannot be constitutionally justified based on the utterly
insubstantial effects on interstate commerce of the tiny fraction of uncompensated
care upon which it potentially operates.
In addition to the factual disconnect between the individual mandate and the
uncompensated care alleged to justify it, the government’s constitutional theories
concerning the effect of uncompensated care suffers a conceptual disconnect in
that the bulk of such care is provided pursuant to charitable donation, government
funding, or unfunded government coercion. None of those things are commercial
activities. Charity is unilateral and non-commercial. Government payment for
medical care, whether directly through Medicaid or indirectly through grants to
hospitals and the like, is a governmental activity, not a commercial one. And
government compulsion of genuinely uncompensated care creates costs imposed
4
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The commerce effects of such

compulsion cannot be used to bootstrap the government to still further authority
under the Commerce Clause.
Finally, the government’s overall approach to the role that economic effects
play in the application of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses is
flawed in that it considers “economic” effects at too high a level of generality,
neglecting the narrower and more particular scope of the constitutional term
“commerce.” Viewed at the government’s level of generality, everything about
human existence is essentially economic, and all actions and inactions have an
effect on the market and hence on commerce. At that level of generality the notion
of commerce and the limits of the Commerce Clause, are rendered meaningless.

ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS VASTLY OVERSTATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND THE ISSUE OF UNCOMPENSATED CARE.

THE

The federal appellants claim that 50 million uninsured annually consume
$116 billion in healthcare, $43 billion of which is uncompensated, “i.e., care not
paid for by the patient or a third party.” Appellants Br. at 11 (citing 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18091(a)(2)(F) and Families USA, Hidden Health Tax: Americans Pay a
Premium, at 2, 6 (2009)); see also Appellants Br. at 2 (“$43 billion in 2008” in
uncompensated care shifted to healthcare providers); id. at 10 (“approximately 50
5
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million people” had no health insurance in 2009 and consumed “over $100 billion
of health care services annually”) (citing Census Bureau Report, Income, Poverty,
and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2009, at 23, table 8, and
Families USA, Hidden Health Tax, at 2 ($116 billion in 2008)”). That $43 billion
purported cost of uncompensated care is supposedly shifted mostly to insurance
companies, resulting in higher premiums for consumers. Appellants Br. at 2. Such
shifting of costs into interstate commerce is then cited as a Commerce-Clause
justification for the individual mandate, which purportedly will “reduce the
uncompensated care obtained by the uninsured and paid for by other participants in
the health care market.”

Id.

Congress itself offered the similar supposed

justification that “that the consumption of health care without insurance has
substantial adverse effects on the interstate health care market.

42 U.S.C.A.

§ 18091(a)(2)(F).
The federal appellants’ claim that the individual mandate is needed because
50 million uninsured are shifting $43 billion in uncompensated-care costs,
however, is misleading and grossly overstated. Whatever effect other provisions in
the Act may have on uncompensated care – a separate and separately contentious
question – the individual mandate itself is unrelated to any significant impact from
uncompensated care on the healthcare market.

6
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As the federal government itself has recognized, the Act in its entirety will
not result in universal insurance and will leave a substantial number of persons
uninsured. According to Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) projections, by
2019, the Act as a whole will only generate coverage for 60% of an otherwise
projected 55 million uninsured, with the individual mandate accounting for
coverage of only 16 million persons. CBO, Analysis of the Major Health Care
Legislation Enacted in March 2010, at 18 (March 30, 2011), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12119/03-30-HealthCareLegislation.pdf
(Table 3 showing estimates of coverage with and without the Act and a total
reduction of only 33 million of the projected uninsured); CBO, Effects of
Eliminating the Individual Mandate to Obtain Health Insurance, at 2 (June 16,
2010),

available

at

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/Eliminate_Individual_Mandate_06_
16.pdf (“eliminating the individual mandate … would increase the number of
uninsured by about 16 million people”).
In seeking to determine whether the individual mandate is justified by the
supposed shifting of uncompensated care costs claimed to have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, it is only the uncompensated care targeted and affected by
the individual mandate that should be relevant to the Commerce Clause analysis.
The pertinent question, therefore, is the cost of uncompensated care that would
7
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exist but for the mandate itself. Translated back to the 2008 cost figures for
uncompensated care, the amount actually at issue when considering the individual
mandate is, at most, based on 32% of the 2008 pool of unemployed, or $13.8
billion (32% of $43 billion in total costs of uncompensated care) in uncompensated
care that might exist – and hence potentially provide the Commerce-Clause
justification – absent the mandate.1
Even that $13.8 billion is a substantial exaggeration of the purported effect
on commerce from costs of uncompensated care supposedly targeted by the
mandate. The reason the figure is exaggerated is that the individual mandate does
not eliminate the costs of uncompensated care even among those persons it causes
to get coverage. In fact, many of the persons affected by the mandate will receive
as much or more uncompensated care even after they obtain coverage, will
1

Because consumption and uncompensated care are based on the 2008 figures of
50 million uninsured, we use that as the denominator when determining the relative
consumption and uncompensated costs for the 16 million whose behavior changes
due to the mandate. For ease of calculation we have conservatively assumed that
the per-person costs of uncompensated care are equally distributed among the
uninsured. However, as discussed below, infra at 13-15, that assumption likely
overestimates the effect of the individual mandate on the amount of
uncompensated care received by those whose behavior will be changed by the
mandate. Many of the 16 million uninsured pressed by the mandate into obtaining
private or employer-based coverage likely consume less healthcare than the
average uninsured, and likely paid out of pocket a higher than average percentage
of their healthcare costs while uninsured. Those persons thus consumed less than
their pro-rata share of uncompensated care, and removing them from the pool of
the uninsured will have a smaller impact in reducing uncompensated care.
8
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consume more care than they would without coverage, will themselves pay less for
such services, and will require governments and third parties to pay far higher total
costs than if they were uninsured.
To see how the mandate does not even address much of the problem
purported to justify it under the Commerce Clause, it is necessary to examine the
type of coverage the 16 million added insureds will obtain as a result of the
mandate. The CBO conveniently provides a breakdown: of the 16 million persons
who would be uninsured but for the mandate, the mandate will cause 4-5 million
persons to obtain employer-sponsored coverage, 5 million persons to obtain
individual coverage (including through the insurance exchanges created by other
parts of the Act), and 6-7 million to obtain governmental coverage under Medicaid
and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). CBO, Effects of Eliminating
the Individual Mandate to Obtain Health Insurance, at 2. Of particular interest is
the 6-7 million persons who will be channeled into governmental coverage. For
those persons, the individual mandate will not substantially reduce the cost of
uncompensated care because such coverage simultaneously increases their
consumption of healthcare services yet systematically under-compensates
providers for such services. The result is that those persons shifted into Medicaid
as a result of the mandate will continue to receive as much or more uncompensated
care as they did when they were uninsured
9
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It is well recognized that the uninsured consume approximately 50% less
healthcare than do the insured.2 Once covered by government programs – under
which they would pay little or nothing for healthcare – the newly covered can be
expected to double their consumption.3 While such consumption will now be
covered under Medicaid and CHIP, it is also well recognized that Medicaid

2

Peter Harbage & Len M. Nichols, A Premium Price: The Hidden Costs All
Californians Pay in Our Fragmented Health Care System, ISSUE BRIEF # 3, at 2
(New
America
Foundation
Dec.
2006),
available
at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/HealthIBNo3.pdf (uninsured receive less than
40% of the care received by the insured in California and nationally receive an
average of 50% of the care received by the insured) (citing for the national figure
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Research Findings #27: Health Care
Expenses in the United States, 2000 (April 2004), available at
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/rf21/rf21.shtml.); Jack Hadley
& John Holahan, How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use and Who Pays
for It?” 2003, HEALTH AFFAIRS, at W3-69 to W3-70, available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/02/12/hlthaff.w3.66.full.pdf (full
year uninsured received about half as much care as the privately insured).
3

Much of the differential consumption is attributable to lack of access to and
resources for health care, particularly for low-income uninsured. For higher
income uninsured, however, those choosing to forego insurance are, on average
healthier, though the 50% consumption differential between insured and uninsured
holds even controlling for health. Jack Hadley, John Holahan, Teresa Coughlin &
Dawn Miller, Covering the Uninsured in 2008: A Detailed Examination of
Current Costs and Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs of Expanding
Coverage, at 19 (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, August
2008), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7809.pdf (“the uninsured
use less care than the insured (holding health status constant), because they pay for
much of their care themselves and because their health is generally better than the
insured’s”). Persons who would receive governmental insurance under the
mandate, however, fall into the former group, with consumption likely a function
of resources and having to internalize much of the cost of care. Once they are
10

Case: 11-11021

Date Filed: 05/12/2011

Page: 18 of 36

systematically underpays for healthcare services, on average paying only 72% of
the amounts paid by Medicare, which itself pays only 80% of what is paid by
private insurers.4 That amounts to Medicaid paying, on average, only 57.6% of
private payers – a 42% underpayment. Appellant HHS itself, however, places
Medicaid payments at only 70% of private health insurance, a 30% underpayment.5
That 30% to 42% underpayment for services provided to those brought into
Medicaid as a result of the individual mandate represents as much or more
uncompensated care as the 37% underpayment by the uninsured asserted by the

under governmental coverage for which they do not have to pay, their consumption
of healthcare that is now entirely free to them will rise.
4

David Olmos, Mayo Clinic in Arizona to Stop Treating Some Medicare patients,
Bloomburg, December 31 2009, (“Nationwide, doctors made about 20 percent less
for treating Medicare patients than they did caring for privately insured patients in
2007, a payment gap that has remained stable during the last decade”), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHoYSI84VdL0;
Stephen Zuckerman, Aimee F. Williams & Karen E. Stockley, Trends in Medicaid
Physician Fees 2003-2008 , Health Affairs, April 28, 2009, at w510 (Medicaid
fees were only 72% of Medicare fees in 2008), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/3/w510.full.html; Colorado Children’s
Healthcare Access Program, Compare: Reimbursement for Medicaid Versus
Commercial Health Insurance Versus Office Expenses, CCHAP Newsletter Three
– Article 1, January 2007, at 2 (reimbursement rates for pediatric care routinely
less than half of commercial rates and rarely above 80% of commercial rates),
available at http://www.cchap.org/newsletter-three/#one.
5

John D. Shatto & M. Kent Clemens, Projected Medicare Expenditures under an
Illustrative Scenario with Alternative Payment Updates to Medicare Providers,
Office of the Actuary, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, HHS, August
5, 2010, at 5 (Figure 1) (Chart Showing Medicaid Payments 30% below private
health
insurance),
available
at
http://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/2010TRAlternativeScenario.pdf.
11
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10-11 (uninsured consume $116

billion in healthcare services in 2008; $43 billion in uninsured healthcare services
uncompensated).6
Combining these numbers yields quite startling results that are wholly at
odds with appellants’ claimed constitutional justifications for the individual
mandate. Assuming a midrange CBO figure of 6.5 million people as the number
of uninsured that will obtain government coverage as a result of the individual
mandate, an average annual healthcare consumption rate for the uninsured of
$2320 per person (based on appellants’ own figures of $116 billion annual
consumption divided by 50 million persons), and an average underpayment rate of
37% for the uninsured (again based on appellants’ own numbers), those 6.5 million
people would consume roughly $5.6 billion worth of uncompensated care if they
were uninsured.

Once driven into governmental coverage by the individual

mandate, however, their per-person consumption will double to $4640 annually
and the underpayment rate will range from 30% to 42% resulting in their
consumption of $9.0 billion to $12.7 billion worth of uncompensated care. Thus,
while the mandate will certainly provide those persons with more care, it actually

6

The undercompensation rate for the uninsured according to the numbers in the
federal appellants’ brief is thus $43 billion divided by $116 billion, or 37%.
12
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increases the amount of uncompensated care they receive and the costs that are
potentially shifted. In medical terms the purported cure is worse than the disease.
Returning to our analysis of the amount of uncompensated care addressed by
the individual mandate, therefore, the uninsured whose behavior will be influenced
by the mandate consume at best $13.8 billion in uncompensated care. But those
shifted into government coverage would continue to consume $9 billion to $12.7 in
uncompensated care even after the mandate due to the consumption incentives and
underpayment of the government programs.

The potential net effect of the

individual mandate on the problem of uncompensated care is now down to, at best,
a net $4.8 billion reduction in such costs – a far cry from the $43 billion effect on
commerce claimed by appellants.

And using the higher estimate of 42%

undercompensation by Medicaid, the individual mandate would only net a $1.1
billion reduction in the cost of uncompensated care.
Even the best-case scenario of a $4.8 billion reduction in uncompensated
care from the uninsured influenced by the mandate continues to be too high. As
many have noted, and as the federal government in fact counts upon, those
uninsured persons who will be pressed by the mandate into buying private
insurance are in fact healthier on average and, by definition, wealthier than those
eligible for government insurance. They are thus unlikely to consume as much

13
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healthcare when uninsured and are capable of themselves paying for a bigger
portion of the healthcare that they do consume while uninsured.
An analysis of the relevant data by other amici in this case notes that persons
subject to the mandate – the young, healthy, and uninsured annually consume, on
average, only $854 per person in healthcare rather than the government’s figure of
$2320 per person.

See Brief for Amici Curiae American Action Forum and

Economists in Support of Appellees/Cross Appellants and Affirmance, May 11,
2011, at 13-14 & App. A. Even continuing to assume that 37% of that amount is
uncompensated care – far less likely at such lower consumption or among
uninsured not poor enough to be eligible for Medicaid – those persons account for
only $316 per person in uncompensated care for a total of $2 billion annually.
Going back to our earlier estimates of $13.8 billion as the amount of
uncompensated care attributable to those whose behavior would be changed by the
mandate, recall that $5.6 billion was attributable to the low-income subgroup that
would obtain Medicaid, leaving $8.2 billion in uncompensated care attributed to
the non-Medicaid-eligible subclass under the government’s usage numbers. But if
this subgroup is indeed healthier and wealthier than average, consumes less than
average, and hence is responsible for only $2 billion ($6.2 billion less than the
earlier estimate), then the total pre-mandate uncompensated care for the 16 million

14
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the mandate will influence is only $7.6 billion, and that becomes the upper limit of
the mandate’s potential savings. Given that shifting the poorer sub-group affected
by the mandate to Medicaid will continue to generate at least $9 billion in
uncompensated care, even under the more conservative estimate of Medicaid
underpayment, the mandate would on balance increase uncompensated by $1.4
billion. And if the undercompensation from Medicaid is at the higher end of the
range, the mandate would actually increase the cost of uncompensated care by $5.1
billion.7
Finally, it is worth noting that what appellants have described as $43 billion
in uncompensated care is not in fact all uncompensated; at least not from the
perspectives of hospitals. Even the source relied upon by appellants, Families
USA, recognizes that at least $1 4 billion or 33% of that amount is paid for by
government grants. Families USA, Hidden Health Tax, at 32 (Appendix Table 1).

7

Even assuming that all 16 million of the uninsured influenced by the mandate
consumed healthcare at the lower rate of $854 per person annually, that would
mean that the group affected by the mandate consumed $13.5 billion in total
healthcare only $5.1 billion of which was uncompensated when they were
uninsured, holding the rate of non-compensation the same. (16 million x $854 x
0.37 = $5.056 billion.) The group that would go to Medicaid then would account
for $5.6 billion in total consumption and $2.1 billion in uncompensated care.
Shifting to Medicaid would double their total consumption to $11.2 billion, for
which Medicaid would undercompensate providers by from 30% to 42%, leading
to uncompensated care of $3.4 to $4.7 billion. Backing that amount out of the
potential $5.1 billion reduction in uncompensated care leaves between $1.7 billion
15
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Thus, at least 33% of the cost of uncompensated care discussed so far is not
absorbed by private providers or passed on to insurance companies, but rather is
paid by the government, no different than the care provided by Medicaid. Such
amounts are not properly included in the costs of uncompensated care supposedly
borne and passed on by healthcare providers thereby affecting interstate commerce.
A more recent study, however, noted that the Families USA figure
overlooked

numerous

sources

of

government

funding

for

otherwise

uncompensated care and concluded that governments, rather than hospitals,
actually pay for 75% of otherwise uncompensated care. Hadley, et al., Covering
the Uninsured in 2008, at 50 (“government payments account for about 75% of the
costs of uncompensated care”); id. at 51 (discussing numbers from Families USA
and describing sources of government funds not included in their uncompensated
care figures); see also Harbage & Nichols, A Premium Price, at 3 (“as much as 85
percent of the costs incurred on behalf of the uninsured and underinsured are paid
for by a combination of governmental subsidy programs”).8 That reduces the

and $0.4 billion as the potential net impact of the mandate in reducing the cost of
uncompensated care.
8

We have not thus far discussed the costs of government payments for
uncompensated care to the uninsured because appellants’ Commerce Clause theory
has turned on the notion that it is the shifting of costs to private providers and
insurers that exerts the requisite effect on interstate commerce necessary to invoke
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. But to the extent that the
government funds care for the uninsured subject to the individual mandate, suffice
16
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amount of uncompensated care costs borne by private providers and supposedly
affecting commerce by 75%. Such government payments reduce the amount of
genuinely uncompensated care from $4.8 billion, supra at 13, to $1.2 billion. That
number would then be swamped by the increase in uncompensated care costs due
to the mandate’s shift of 6.5 million people into Medicaid.

Those former

uninsured would generate from $9 to $12.7 billion in uncompensated consumption,
75% of which would presumably still be offset by indirect government payments,
thus resulting in $2.3 to $3.2 billion in genuinely uncompensated care and hence a
net increase in uncompensated care from the mandate of $1.1 to $2.0 billion.
What all the preceding analysis amply demonstrates is that uncompensated
care to the uninsured, and any supposed cost shifting that results therefrom, is an
issue that has little or nothing to do with the individual mandate, is not
significantly cured and may in fact be exacerbated by the individual mandate, and
that even using the government’s own questionable numbers and conservative
assumptions, the amount of genuinely uncompensated care that might be addressed
by the mandate is at most $1.2 billion annually. And that potential reduction

it to say that the mandate, even with its penalty provisions, does not ameliorate
such costs but in fact exacerbates them. As the CBO has recognized, the
individual mandate will impose a net cost to the federal government of $252 billion
dollars between 2014, when it becomes effective, and 2020. CBO, Effects of
Eliminating the Individual Mandate to Obtain Health Insurance, at 1-2. Such
17
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would be more than offset by the increase in uncompensated care from shifting 6.5
million people onto Medicaid.
Aside from the offsetting increase from pushing more people into Medicaid,
however, even the bare $1.2 billion of relevant uncompensated care pre-mandate is
trivial in the context of national spending on healthcare of $2.4 trillion dollars, It
amounts to an inconsequential 0.05% of spending and certainly does not have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. In fact, it is effectively a rounding error.
Rather than the individual mandate being a means of addressing $43 billion in
uncompensated care and supposed cost shifting that significantly affects
commerce, it at best addresses a miniscule amount of costs that are unlikely to be
noticed, much less shifted, in the context of interstate commerce in healthcare. At
worst, the mandate actually causes more uncompensated care than it purports to
address. Nothing in such circumstances supports an invocation of the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses based on the effects on interstate commerce of
the uninsured covered by the mandate.

costs overwhelmingly exceed any amounts the government may currently pay
toward uncompensated care for those who are subject to the mandate.
18
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RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN

Even apart from the lack of any substantial connection between the actual
conduct affected by the individual mandate and the problem of uncompensated
care, the relationship between any such healthcare and “commerce” is likewise far
more attenuated than the federal appellants suggest. As the federal appellants
readily acknowledge, much of the reason people receive uncompensated care in
times of need is because “[f]or decades, state and federal laws have required
emergency rooms to stabilize any patient who arrives with an emergency
condition, regardless of whether the person has insurance or otherwise can pay.”
Appellants Br. at 8; see also id. at 35-36. Even apart from such requirements,
private doctors and hospitals would and do provide care to those without the means
to pay out of humanitarian and charitable impulses. Providing essential services
without regard to financial means is, of course, laudable, just as providing food,
clothing, and housing to the poor and homeless likewise reflects the compassion
and generosity of so many in our society. But such praiseworthy activity is best
characterized as charity, not commerce. Conflating the two strips away the wellestablished line between economic and non-economic activities, reflected in the
Constitution’s delimiting use of the word “commerce” itself, Supreme Court case
law, tax code provisions regarding nonprofits and charitable deductions, and
common sense.

See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
19
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(distinguishing commercial and non-commercial activities, even where the latter
may have an effect on commerce); 501(c) corporations and deductions for
charitable donations.
The fact that many persons pay for the same services via a commercial
transaction – whether through an insurance policy or out-of pocket – or can pay for
some, though not all, of the services they receive, does not render the mere act of
giving such services without compensation a commercial transaction. Such giving
lacks the bilateral nature of commerce properly understood, and is a unilateral
response to a need, rather than an exchange.
That such charitable giving of services may often be mandated by
government edict or longstanding tort principles – and hence not always charity in
the strict sense of a voluntary gift – does not alter this basic reasoning or render
such giving commerce. “Uncompensated” care funded by charitable donations to
hospitals, clinics, and the voluntary donation of time by private doctors remains
charitable, regardless whether further duties also compel such care.

And

“uncompensated” care funded by government grants and subsidies likewise
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remains charitable rather than commercial – it is merely the government that is
choosing to provide such charitable resources.9
That private charities or the government choose to fund or compel care for
those who cannot afford it may well have economic effects on the market, but it is
not itself commerce and does not shift costs to other participants in the commercial
market. Rather, those costs are born by those electing to give charity or by the
government via taxing and spending. But an effect on charitable decisions or
governmental spending decisions is not an effect – substantial or otherwise – on
commerce. It is an effect on non-commercial categories of activity that does not
readily fit within the category of “commerce.”
Finally, to the extent that the government compels providers to provide
uncompensated medical services they would not otherwise provide, the costs of
those services are not being imposed or shifted by the recipients, but rather by the
government itself. In that instance it is the government that is imposing costs and
potentially affecting commerce, not the underlying recipients of such services.
9

Even if government spending on healthcare for those who cannot pay for it is not
deemed charity, it would still not be commercial, but rather governmental in
nature, no different from numerous types of government aid and even Medicaid
itself. Government spending must be viewed as something different than private
commerce insofar as it is subject to the different constitutional authority for the
government to tax and spend for the general welfare, and conflating it with private
commerce would collapse much of the distinction between those two sources of
and limits on federal power.
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Attributing those costs to the recipients of government-coerced care, and then
claiming Commerce-Clause authority to preemptively regulate all potential future
recipients of coerced care a result, is disingenuous bootstrapping. The cause of any
economic distortion is the government itself.

The federal government cannot

expand its own authority by manufacturing the circumstances of uncompensated
care and claiming that such circumstances now affect interstate commerce. There
is no limit to the Commerce Clause if the federal government can attribute the
consequences of its own conduct to citizens who have engaged in no commercial
transactions.
III.

APPELLANTS PRESENT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “ECONOMIC” ACTIVITY
AND “COMMERCE” AT TOO HIGH A LEVEL OF GENERALITY FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES.
Finally, amici offer a brief observation on the federal appellants’ conflation

of broadly conceived economic principles of supply and demand with the
necessarily narrower constitutional concept of “commerce.” Taken to extremes,
amici suppose that all attributes of human existence could be described in
economic terms in that they create (or fail to create) demand for various goods and
services broadly defined.

Life necessarily entails both needs and desires –

demand, at least in the abstract. We need food, water, and shelter to live. We
desire numerous goods and services to improve our condition or fulfill our goals –
education, companionship, information, entertainment, luxury. Sometimes such
22
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demand is met and sometimes not. Sometimes we supply the demand ourselves or
with our family, sometimes others meet the demand. Sometimes we are simply
given the things we need or want – by friends, generous strangers, the government
– and sometimes we obtain that which we need or want as part of an exchange.
Only the latter means of fulfilling our needs and wants can even begin to be
considered “commerce” in the constitutional sense of an affirmative transaction
involving the exchange of goods, services, or money. A unilateral gift of services
is not such an exchange and is not commerce. While the federal government may
deem such limitations and others to be overly formalistic and claim that all means
of meeting demand and even the failure to create demand have effects on the
economy, the law must recognize the necessity and propriety of such formalisms.
The Constitution and the Supreme Court have drawn certain distinctions that
must be respected, notwithstanding what the government might think. Because the
Constitution limits the federal government’s power to regulating “commerce,”
there must be a category of behavior that is not commerce. Because the Supreme
Court has distinguished between commercial and non-commercial activities,
notwithstanding attenuated upstream or downstream effects on the economy, this
Court should likewise do the same. Charity, like many other activities, is not
properly deemed a “commercial” activity. Similarly, this Court also should follow
the Supreme Court in its consistently limited application of the Commerce power
23
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to the regulation of affirmative activities, rather than mere inactivity or the
inchoate potential for future activity. Failure to draw such limits on the theory that
economic effects transcend all such formalistic boundaries would abandon the very
formalities inherent in the written constitution from which government – including
the courts – gain their legitimacy. “That way there be dragons.”
Under the federal appellants’ view, mere existence is inevitably economic in
nature and has an effect (positive or negative) on virtually all markets. Regardless
whether such a high level of generality in considering markets and economics is
plausible as an academic exercise, it is unacceptable as a constitutional theory. By
its very words, the Commerce Clause and the case-law surrounding it presuppose
and require a much lower level of generality that gives meaning to each of the
distinctions described above. If the mere incidents of existence are economic, then
everything is economic, everything affects commerce, and the Commerce Clause is
an empty shell.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this Court should affirm the decision below insofar as
it declares the individual mandate unconstitutional and declines to sever it from the
remaining provisions of the Act.
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